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I. INTRODUCTION
Presidential impeachments test nearly everyone.
Whereas
constitutional adjudication largely tests the limits and powers of
governmental institutions, presidential impeachments do that and more.
They test whether and how members of Congress may fulfill their oaths to
do “impartial justice according to the laws and Constitution of the United
States;” whether, or to what extent, presidents have abused their powers;
how well the American public and media understand the stakes and issues
involved in the impeachment process; and to what extent Article III courts
refrain from reviewing any aspect of impeachment trials.1 A popular
concern for most observers and commentators during the two
impeachments of Donald Trump was that these institutions – particularly
Congress, the President, and the media – failed the American people and
the Constitution.
Why, many people have wondered, should the House of
Representatives have bothered not once, but twice, to impeach Donald
Trump when there was no realistic chance of securing his conviction in a
Senate trial given the likely unanimity of Republicans to vote to acquit?
This question led to other questions, such as whether the constitutional
threshold for conviction, requiring at least two-thirds of the Senate in
favor, was too demanding? Could the House have done a better job in
drafting impeachment articles in either impeachment of Donald Trump?
Should the focus in either impeachment have been broader or narrower
than it was?2 Was the focus in the first on Trump’s negotiations with
Ukraine’s president and Trump’s failures to comply with nearly ten
congressional subpoenas too technical for most of the American public to
understand or get behind? How should the impeachment process be
reformed? Could the media have done a better job of informing or
educating the public about impeachment in each case? How well did the
lawyers prosecuting and defending Mr. Trump in the two Senate trials
perform? Did they go too far and violate the norms and rules of
professional responsibility? For many observers of these events, the
answer to all these questions is the same—that the federal impeachment
process is broken.
This Article rejects the common view of the two Trump
impeachments as a constitutional debacle. It asserts, instead, that the
federal impeachment process retains significant vitality as a mechanism
for holding presidents accountable for misconduct in office. If we take a

1

See U.S. CONST. § 3, cl. 2; see also Procedure and Guidelines for Impeachment
Trials in the Senate, S. Doc. No. 93–33, 99th Cong., 2d Session, at 61 (1986); see
generally Michael J. Gerhardt, Rediscovering Non-Justiciability: Judicial Review of
Impeachments after Nixon, 44 DUKE L.J. 231 (1994).
2
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
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step back from the tiny set of presidential impeachment trials in American
history and adopt a more panoramic view of their effects and connections
to other disciplinary mechanisms for presidential misconduct, it is easier
to see that presidential impeachments still have bite. In fact, they can and
do cripple legacies and reputations, create permanent evidentiary records
of presidential misconduct, and deter some, if not the most, egregious
kinds of presidential misconduct. In the aftermath of Trump’s second
impeachment, state officials, too, played instrumental roles in curbing his
efforts to undermine the integrity of the electoral process and to commit
voter fraud. In this manner, states provided a check on the president’s
overreaching.
Part II sets forth the surprisingly strong case against impeachment’s
effectiveness in holding presidents accountable for their misconduct in
office, a view that I sometimes have had myself. Nonetheless, Part III both
dissects that case and shows how the two impeachments of Donald Trump
damaged his legacy, reputation, and power. Public opinion is not an
insignificant deterrent of presidential mischief, and the two impeachments
of Donald Trump took their toll in his defeat in his reelection bid. Part IV
examines the extensive lawyerly misconduct in the two Trump
impeachments. Lastly, in Part V, I consider some modest reforms that
may help to ensure that presidential impeachment trials are
constitutionally meaningful events, even when they result in the acquittal
of the president.

II. IS THE IMPEACHMENT PROCESS BROKEN?
There are many reasons why legal commentators have considered the
federal impeachment process to be broken. For these same reasons, I too,
have been skeptical of the efficacy of the process, particularly after the two
acquittals of Donald Trump.
Such skepticism is far from unwarranted. After all, no American
president has ever been convicted in an impeachment trial.3 Three
presidents – Andrew Johnson (1868), Bill Clinton (1998), and Donald
Trump (2020, 2021) – have been impeached by the House but acquitted in
the Senate.4 The only one of these to come close was Johnson, who fell
one vote short of being convicted and removed from office.5 These
outcomes suggest that the constitutional threshold for conviction,
requiring at least two-thirds approval in the Senate, may be practically
impossible to meet in the case of a president. There was strong evidence
in each case of presidential misconduct, with Johnson’s obstruction of
3

See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, IMPEACHMENT: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS
31–38 (Oxford University Press 2018).
4
Id.
5
Id. at 32–33.

TO KNOW
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Reconstruction, Clinton’s lying under oath and obstruction of justice, and
Trump’s both abusing his powers and obstructing Congress in his first
impeachment and inciting insurrection in his second.
True, Richard Nixon faced a serious threat of impeachment and
removal after two years of investigations into the Watergate scandal. He
resigned shortly after the House Judiciary Committee approved three
articles of impeachment, effectively removing the necessity for fully
gearing up the impeachment process.6 Nixon was thus an instance of a
forced resignation, something that seems difficult to imagine ever
happening again, particularly in light of several developments that make
surpassing the constitutional threshold for conviction effectively
impossible.
The first is the rise of extreme partisanship, under which each party’s
goal has been to vanquish the other and control the levels of government
as much as possible.7 This development was instrumental in ensuring
Clinton’s acquittal and Trump’s two acquittals. In all three cases of
impeachment, the respective president’s party controlled more than a third
of the Senate.8 With virtually all of each president’s partisans united in
opposition to convictions, removal was never a serious possibility.
With neither Clinton nor Trump ever facing a real likelihood of ouster
or sanction through impeachment, more pressure was applied to other
disciplinary mechanisms, such as criminal prosecution. Ultimately,
Clinton pled guilty to perjury and was appropriately sanctioned by federal
district judge Susan Webber Wright; Trump has yet to face any concrete
legal fallout from the misconduct that was the focus of each of his trials.9
The second development is the rise of the internet and social media,10
which has largely served as an echo chamber rather than the means for
educating the public on matters of civic importance. Such circumstances
contrast with the hopes of such framers as James Madison that the public’s
interest in the intricate system of checks and balances would grow with
time. As Madison wrote, “I go on this great republican principle, that the
people will have virtue and intelligence to select [people] of virtue and
wisdom.”11 Implicit in Madison’s argument was the people’s disposition
to be discerning about who these people “of virtue and wisdom” would be.
Instead, the proliferation of partisan news outlets, primarily interested in
entertaining rather than educating the public, has made it harder for people

6

Id. at 34.
See Michael J. Gerhardt, Madison’s Nightmare Has Come to America, THE
ATLANTIC (Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/02/
constitution-flawed/606208/ [https://perma.cc/B6C2-UQ55].
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
7
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to break free of the curated news that they prefer to read or watch. That
difficulty, in turn, reinforces the extreme partisanship that keeps people
fixed in their niche and facilitates tribalism, in which there is no
objectively shared sense of reality and facts are shaped by news sources
and political actors rather than the events themselves.
The third significant development is the constitutional amendment to
alter the scheme for selecting senators. The original Constitution had state
legislatures choose their respective senators, but the 17th amendment,12
ratified in 1913, did away with that scheme in favor of having the people
of each State vote in statewide Senate elections. While the original
purpose of the amendment was to free senators – and their states – from
the corrupting influence of state legislatures, the practical effect of the
amendment has been to make senators acutely sensitive not to the
institutional needs or responsibilities of the Senate, but to popular opinion
and support within their respective states.
A final development impeding the functioning of the federal
impeachment process is the popularity of the “unitary theory of the
executive” among conservative lawyers and presidents.13 This theory
posits that the president should have control over the exercise of all
executive power. It is grounded in reading the text of Article II of the
Constitution as investing all “executive power” in the president and in the
need for such a theory to ensure the uniform enforcement of federal law.14
This construction of the scope of presidential power, vested Mr. Trump,
in his capacity as president, with the final say over what information
produced within the executive branch was covered by executive privilege
and therefore could be denied to Congress. Meaning, even in his own
impeachment proceedings investigating presidential misconduct, he could
control what information Congress could receive. Mr. Trump ordered the
entire executive branch not to cooperate with what his White House
Counsel characterized as a “partisan” and “unconstitutional” impeachment
proceeding.15 As Mr. Trump declared during the first trial, “[W]e have all
the material. They don’t have the material.”16
Under such an
12

U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
See generally STEVEN CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER YOO, THE UNITARY
EXECUTIVE: FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (Yale University Press 2008).
14
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The executive power shall be vested in a
President of the United States . . .”).
15
Aaron Blake, The White House’s scathing and legally dubious impeachment
letter,
annotated,
THE
WASHINGTON
POST
(Oct.
9,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/10/09/white-houses-scathinglegally-questionable-impeachment-letter-annotated/ [https://perma.cc/7NFJ-GXSC].
16
Peter Wade, Trump Brags About Concealing Impeachment Evidence: ‘We
Have All the Material, They Don’t’, ROLLING STONE (Jan. 20, 2022),
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/trump-impeachment-evidencewe-have-all-the-material-they-dont-941140/ [https://perma.cc/9PZU-5966].
13
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understanding of executive power, the president is able to thwart an
impeachment investigation and effectively place himself beyond the reach
of the one power that the Constitution vests in Congress to address the
most serious kinds of abuse of power by the president.17
Indeed, appearing to follow such a conception of executive power,
Trump went reputedly further to destroy – or have his staff destroy –
documents rather than share them with Congress, as the House’s
subpoenas had requested, or the National Archives, as federal law
required. Such a construction of presidential power is hard to square with
a constitution, such as ours, that is premised on the idea that no one is
above the law.18 Indeed, if Trump was able to amass enough power to
thwart Congress’s impeachment investigation under the pretext of
protecting executive privilege, then there is little reason to believe that
future presidents would refrain from abusing their executive authority to
remain in office. The unitary theory of the executive thus has given rise
to widening concerns that it may become a basis for presidents to destroy
incriminating evidence, silence dissent, or undertake any other actions to
prevent Congress from impeaching, convicting, and removing them from
office.
For many, the convergence of these developments has drained the
federal impeachment process of whatever original utility it once had as a
check on presidential misconduct. Yet, as the next part shows, the
convergence of these factors does not tell the full story of how
impeachment works.

III. HOW IMPEACHMENT WORKS
If we adopted a more panoramic view of impeachment, going beyond
the small number of presidential impeachment trials to the effects of
impeachment and how impeachment coordinates with other mechanisms
for holding presidents – and their lawyers – accountable for their
misconduct, it is clear that impeachments have more sting than many
people have recognized. Four presidential impeachment trials are a tiny
data set from which to derive broad conclusions. They do not comprise,
in other words, much common law at all. There are just too few cases
from which we can draw any broader lessons about the actual efficacy of
the federal impeachment process.

17

Kimberly Wehle, Congress Has Lost Its Power Over Trump, THE ATLANTIC
(Feb. 4, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/02/checks-andbalances-trump-has-swept-away/606013/ [https://perma.cc/YGF9-DVN5].
18
This understanding of the Constitution has driven the reasoning and outcomes
of a number of Supreme Court decisions, including United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683 (1974), and, more recently, Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020).
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Indeed, the numbers do not all point in one direction: While fiftyseven votes for conviction in the second Senate impeachment trial fell ten
short of the number the Constitution requires for conviction, fifty-seven
votes for conviction are the most votes for conviction in any presidential
impeachment trial in American history.19 Perhaps more importantly, that
number included seven Republicans—the most senators ever to vote to
convict a president from their own party and risk the censure of their party
by doing so.20 But that is not all. If we broaden our view, there were more
than sixty-seven senators who seriously denounced Trump’s involvement
in the storming of the Capitol on January 6, 2021, to stop Congress from
certifying the final results of the 2020 presidential election, which Trump
lost.21 Perhaps the most searing came from Minority Leader Mitch
McConnell (R-KY), who condemned Trump for being “practically and
morally responsible for the unprecedented mob attack on Congress.”22
True, Senator McConnell voted to acquit – ostensibly because he opposed
using the impeachment process against someone no longer in office – and
later said he would support Trump if he were again the Republican
nominee for president, but his criticism of Trump sticks because it came
from a (former) Trump ally and powerful leader of the Senate
Republicans.23
While Trump can relish his acquittal only by ignoring the strong
bipartisan condemnation of his behavior, historians, most of the American
people, and many, if not most, members of Congress will not. They
understand that Trump has tarnished his own legacy, and no amount of
lying, protesting the truth, or blaming others can change the likelihood of
his dropping to the near bottom of chief executives because of his dual
impeachment and corruption in office. If Trump has any future in
Aaron O’Neill, Votes for Presidential Impeachment in the U.S. Senate in
1868-2021, STATISTA (June 21, 2022), https://www.statista.com/statistics/1085077/
impeachment-vote-us-senate-clinton-johnson/ [https://perma.cc/3BDN-ANWN].
20
Barbara Sprunt, 7 GOP Senators Voted to Convict Trump. Only 1 Faces
Voters Next Year, NPR (Feb. 15, 2021), https://www.npr.org/sections/trumpimpeachment-trial-live-updates/2021/02/15/967878039/7-gop-senators-voted-toconvict-trump-only-1-faces-voters-next-year. [https://perma.cc/QQ8G-A9XX].
21
See Senate Trial Proceedings from the Congressional Record (2021),
https://www.govinfo.gov/collection/impeachment-related-publications
[https://perma.cc/996F-CC6P]; see also Ian Millhiser, The overwhelming strength of
the case against Trump, in one number, VOX (Feb. 14, 2021),
https://www.vox.com/2021/2/14/22282760/trump-impeachment-senatemalapportionment-76-million-acquital-conviction-capitol [https://perma.cc/UH7GX7XD].
22
U.S. News Staff, READ: McConnell Speech After Trump's Impeachment Trial
Acquittal, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 14, 2021), https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/
articles/2021-02-14/read-mcconnell-speech-after-trumps-impeachment-trialacquittal.
23
Id.
19
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American politics, that says more about the state of the American polity
than it does Trump.
The relative rarity of presidential impeachments – with only three
presidents actually impeached for misconduct – does not foreclose the
possibility that they may have deterrent effects on possible presidential
(and other) misconduct. For example, Richard Nixon chose not to defy
the Supreme Court ordering him to turn over White House tapes to the
special prosecutor investigating him based in part on the likelihood any
such defiance would be disastrous for him politically (his popularity would
plummet further) and would surely have increased the likelihood there
were enough votes in the Senate to convict and remove him from office.24
In 2019, Special Counsel Robert Mueller documented White House
Counsel Don McGahn’s threat to quit his post if the President fired
Mueller and Trump’s subsequent reluctance not to terminate Mueller.25
White House counsel Pat Cippolone had pledged to quit if Trump persisted
in trying to thwart the peaceful transition to the Biden Administration.
And while, in the immediate aftermath of the attack on the U.S. Capitol on
January 6, 2021 he did not follow through,26 it did force Trump to look for
ways to maneuver around both Cippolone’s office and the Acting Attorney
General to cobble together an ad hoc team that would fight to keep
President Trump in the White House, a team that proved to be quite
ineffective.27 In other less well-documented instances, presidents may
have opted to forego some misbehavior out of the fear that they would be
impeached.
Moreover, the public seems to have understood the federal
impeachment process, including the scope of impeachable offenses, better
than commentators might have recognized. Indeed, while the public
largely believed that Clinton had committed the misconduct charged in the
two impeachment articles approved by the House, they did not believe the

24

See Jeff Shesol, When Presidents Think About Defying the Courts, THE NEW
YORKER (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/whenpresidents-think-about-defying-the-courts [https://perma.cc/5PAD-4X2T].
25
Michael S. Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, Trump Ordered Mueller Fired, But
Backed Off When White House Counsel Threatened to Quit, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/25/us/politics/trump-mueller-specialcounsel-russia.html/ [https://perma.cc/GRJ2-685H].
26
Pamela Brown, White House Counsel Considering Resigning, Sources Say,
CNN (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/08/politics/pat-cipollone-whitehouse-counsel/index.html [https://perma.cc/NA5P-X2CT].
27
Matt Zapotosky, Devlin Barrett, & Carol D. Leoning, Trump entertained plan
to install an attorney general who would help him pursue baseless election fraud
claims, THE WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 22, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
national-security/trump-justice-department-overturn-election/2021/01/22/b7f0b9fa5d1c-11eb-a976-bad6431e03e2_story.html [https://perma.cc/HPV5-MDA7].
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misconduct was impeachable.28 Even within the Senate, more than sixtyseven senators denounced Clinton for his misconduct.29
More recently, a slight majority of Americans supported the effort to
convict and remove Trump based on the House Intelligence Report in the
first impeachment, and nearly sixty-percent of the American people
supported Trump’s conviction, even after he had left office.30 Most of the
forty-three senators who voted to acquit Trump in his second trial
explained they did so on their beliefs that former presidents are not subject
to impeachment.31 Yet, a majority of the Senate formally voted (56–44)
to acknowledge and accept jurisdiction over the trial even though Trump
was no longer in office when the trial began.32 Senator Richard Burr (RNC) explained in his post-trial statement on why he voted to convict
Trump that he had accepted that a majority of the Senate had retained
jurisdiction and therefore felt he had no choice but to vote on the merits of
the case.33 For him, the merits were clear—he voted to convict Trump.34
Some others, like Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA), voted against
jurisdiction but accepted the decision of the Senate to hold the trial and
thus reached the merits of the case.35 He voted to acquit.36 And there were
more than sixty-seven senators who delivered post-trial statements
condemning Trump’s misconduct.37 Thus, even if the media failed to do
more to enrich popular understanding of the law of impeachment in either
trial, the public still got the message of the House Managers in each of the
Trump impeachments. The public’s take in each impeachment of Trump
28
MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 180 (3d ed., University of Chicago
Press, 2019).
29
Id.
30
“Majority Support Trump Impeachment,” MONMOUTH POLLING (Jan. 25,
2021), https://www.monmouth.edu/polling-institute/reports/monmouthpoll_us_
012521/ [https://perma.cc/SJ2L-LJUA]; Aaron Bycoffe, Ella Koeze, & Nathanial
Rakich, “Did Majority Support Removing Trump from Office?”, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(Feb.
12,
2020),
https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/impeachment-polls/
[https://perma.cc/NC5B-H226].
31
S. REP. NO. 117-28 at 17 (2021).
32
S. REP. NO. 117-24 at 21 (2021).
33
Senator Burr Statement on Vote to Convict Former President Trump on
Article
of
Impeachment,
RICHARD
BURR
(Feb.
13,
2021),
https://www.burr.senate.gov/2021/2/senator-burr-statement-on-vote-to-convictformer-president-trump-on-article-of-impeachment [https://perma.cc/CB5H-CX6Q].
34
S. REP. NO. 117-28 at 17 (2021).
35
S. REP. NO. 117-24 at 21 (2021) (vote for jurisdiction); S. REP. NO. 117-28 at
17 (2021) (vote to acquit).
36
S. REP. NO. 117-28 at 17 (2021).
37
Michael J. Gerhardt, Impeachment Still Matters, SLATE (Mar. 5, 2021),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/03/donald-trumps-two-impeachmentsmattered.html [https://perma.cc/G8BY-FQZC].
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may have helped to put Biden into the White House. In other words, the
more people who thought Trump should be convicted, the less support he
had in critical jurisdictions for winning a second term.
In both Trump impeachment proceedings,38 there was evidence that
Trump had engaged in serious misconduct. In the first, multiple witnesses
with first-hand knowledge reported Trump’s request for a personal “favor”
from Ukraine’s President Zelensky in exchange for Zelensky’s
announcing the opening of criminal investigations into then-presidential
candidate Joseph Biden.39 In addition, Trump himself admitted – and
never denied – that he had defied Congress’s investigation by refusing to
comply with nearly a dozen legislative subpoenas.40 In his second
impeachment, there was video (aired on every network) of Trump’s urging
an insurrection by stoking supporters to storm Congress on January 6,
2021. Such evidence undoubtedly stained Trump’s legacy. If the evidence
and the public’s conclusion that Trump should have been convicted in each
of these trials do not prevent Trump from being elected president in 2024,
it will say much more about the American people than it does about the
effectiveness of the federal impeachment process.

IV. LAWYERLY MISCONDUCT IN DEFENDING TRUMP
Another failure in each of the two impeachment trials of Donald
Trump was the encouragement of lawyers’ unethical misconduct. This is,
of course, a failure on the lawyers’ part, even if Trump did not command
it. For example, some administration lawyers merely acquiesced to the
president’s demands and facilitated his most egregious misconduct. I take
three examples from congressional investigations into possible Trump
misconduct, including Trump’s persistent efforts to overturn the
presidential election that he lost and destruction of documents that the
Presidential Records Act requires be preserved for the National
Archives.41
One example is a memorandum from Trump’s White House Counsel
issued in response to the initial impeachment investigation in early
October 2019. The Memorandum was replete with misleading and false
38

E.g., S. REP. NO. 116-22 at 2 (2020) (2020 impeachment); S. REP. NO. 117-25
at 26 (2021) (2021 impeachment).
39
See S. REP. NO. 116-22 at 22 (2020).
40
Id. at 4.
41
Cf. Nixon v. General Services Administration, 433 U.S. 425, 440 (1977);
Earlier this year, the Supreme Court rejected Trump’s efforts to bar the House
Committee investigating his involvement in the January 6th riot from gaining access
to documents produced on behalf of his presidency. Melissa Quinn, Supreme Court
Rejects Trump Request to Shield Release of Records to January 6 Committee, CBS
NEWS (Jan. 20, 2022), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-supreme-courtjanuary-6-document-release/ [https://perma.cc/S6YH-SLVE].
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statements of fact and law.42 It reiterated the canard that the
whistleblower’s report – shared with the House Intelligence Committee –
was a “false account” of then-President Trump’s July 25, 2019, phone call
with Ukraine’s president, though no evidence was ever produced
undermining the account.43 Indeed, there was nothing false about it. In
fact, it was corroborated by virtually every witness who testified before
the House Intelligence Committee.44 Even worse, the people testifying
against were not Democrats but were people from within Trump’s own
administration. It is an understatement to suggest that those testifying in
defiance of the President’s wishes were courageous and committed to the
rule of law. It does not just strain credulity but decimates it to maintain
that everyone who has testified under oath in these hearings is lying while
only the President is telling the truth.
The Memorandum repeatedly insisted that the President’s call was
“appropriate” because his concern was with corruption in Ukraine.45 If the
President had such a concern, it is striking that it was never mentioned
anywhere in his speeches or, more pertinent to the impeachment, in any of
Trump’s calls with Ukraine’s president. Indeed, the word “corruption”
does not appear in the transcript. The president had no general concern
about corruption in that country but instead, as numerous witnesses
attested and new documents produced after the impeachment confirm, his
concern was always about the Bidens.46 In the infamous July 25th call
with the President of Ukraine, Trump mentioned the Bidens five
times.47 He did not otherwise mention corruption. The evidence found by
the House Intelligence Committee showed that a systematic effort to create
a shadow operation to get rid of the United States’ exemplary ambassador
in Ukraine was all done for the purpose of putting pressure on Ukraine to
agree merely to the announcement of an investigation against the
Bidens.48 There was, in fact, no concern about an actual investigation, just

42

E.g., WHITE HOUSE MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO THE IMPEACHMENT
INQUIRY 1-2 (Oct. 8, 2019) (on file with the NY Times) [hereinafter “White House
Memo”].
43
Id. at 2.
44
E.g., S. REP. NO. 116-22 at 2 (2020).
45
E.g., White House Memo, supra note 42 at 2.
46
E.g., S. REP. NO. 116-22 at 2 (2020); see also “Trump asked Ukraine president
in phone call ‘if you can look into’ Biden and his son”, CNBC (Sept. 25, 2019),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/25/trump-asked-ukraine-president-if-you-can-lookinto-biden-and-his-son-in-phone-call.html [https://perma.cc/5AKE-J4XW].
47
Read Trump’s phone conversation with Volodymyr Zelensky, CNN (Sept. 26,
2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/25/politics/donald-trump-ukraine-transcriptcall/index.html [https://perma.cc/4S7N-39UD].
48
Committee Releases Ambassador Bill Taylor’s Deposition Transcript As Part
of Impeachment Inquiry, H.R. PRESS RELEASE (Nov. 6, 2019),
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the announcement, and the reason why is obvious—to promulgate dirt on
a likely rival in the next presidential election.
The Memorandum repeatedly complained that the House did not
afford the president “due process.”49 Constitutional “due process,”
generally speaking, requires notice of a hearing and an impartial decisionmaker.50 Throughout the House’s impeachment proceedings, Republicans
on the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees proclaimed “due process”
was a problem.51 Yet, the very same Republicans who made this
complaint had been invited to or participated in the closed-door
depositions they complained were not open to them. Moreover, “due
process” does not apply to these proceedings, since “due process” applies
to the government when it is depriving someone of “life, liberty, or
property.” In an impeachment, none of those are at risk, so the clause does
not apply. The President had the safeguards, and more, throughout the
House proceedings. He was given a great deal of fair process – including
being invited to attend the testimony of constitutional law scholars and
even to question them – but he or his White House Counsel turned the
opportunities down. Ultimately, their point was to reap the political or
partisan benefits of making such complaints rather than actually setting
any record straight.
Further, the Memorandum declared that no one had “direct
knowledge” of the problematic call with Zelensky and that the House’s
evidence was nothing but “speculation and hearsay.”52 To begin, these
were political talking points, not genuine legal arguments. Numerous
prosecutions and impeachments have turned on indirect or circumstantial
evidence; the Constitution does not forbid this, nor do the rules of either
the House or the Senate. Moreover, key witnesses with “direct
knowledge” of the call were ordered by the President not to testify.53 The
President’s lawyers defended the President’s refusals to comply with
House subpoenas related to the House’s investigation of the July 25th call
on the ground that as president, Trump was entitled to assert legal defenses

https://intelligence.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=797
[https://perma.cc/L2ZF-6JKZ].
49
E.g., White House Memo, supra note 42 at 3.
50
See Amdt5.4.5.4.6 Impartial Decision Maker, Constitution Annotated,
https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt5-4-5-4-6/ALDE_00000886/
[https://perma.cc/2ZPT-TPNR].
51
Alison Durkee, GOP Flatters Trump with Impeachment Report Claiming He
Didn’t
Do
Anything
Wrong,
VANITY
FAIR
(Dec
2,
2019),
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2019/12/republican-impeachment-report-houseintelligence-committee-trump [https://perma.cc/7P8E-65JM].
52
S. DOC. NO. 116-12, at 152–53 (2020), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/
CDOC-116sdoc12/pdf/CDOC-116sdoc12-pt3.pdf [https://perma.cc/WCQ8-EV8E].
53
Id. at 187.
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in response to them. But that was not, nor could it be, the case when he
ordered the entire executive branch not to cooperate with the inquiry.54
That was not a defense. That was obstruction.
The Memorandum also suggested that the two articles of
impeachment the House was preparing to approve in 2019 were
“impermissibly duplicitous” and that impeachable offenses must be
“violations of established law.”55 Abuse of power, charged in the first
article, is not “duplicitous” in the least. One merely needs to read the
constitutional convention debates and The Federalist Papers to know the
Framers put impeachment in the Constitution as a check on abuse of
power.56 The Memorandum never bothered to consider, as Rule 3.3
counsels, what an abuse of power is.57 In fact, it is the exercise of power
in violation of the Constitution. So, it did violate a law, in this case the
supreme law of the land.
In addition, the Memorandum argued that the fact that the president
is unique among federal officials is precisely why he may not be
impeached, convicted, and removed for abuse of power.58 As Trump
himself explained early in his presidency, the Constitution enabled him “to
do whatever I want.”59
According to the Memorandum, the only means for holding the
president accountable for misconduct in office was through elections.60
That was exactly what Mr. Trump wanted—to be able, in the Ukraine
situation, to turn the circumstance to his personal advantage and condition
the congressional appropriations for Ukraine on meeting his personal
benefit. The Memorandum insisted that removing Trump on the basis of
54

Id. at 191–92.
Id. at 172–73, 251–52.
56
See Madison Debates, (July 19, 1787), https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_
century/debates_719.asp [https://perma.cc/3ZZT-2XK9]; See also Federalist Papers:
No. 77: The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive
Considered
From
the
New
York
Packet,
(April
4,
1788),
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed77.asp [https://perma.cc/L3TD-RERL].
57
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.12 (Am. Bar Ass'n, Discussion Draft
1983); Rule 3.3: Candor Toward the Tribunal, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model
_rules_of_professional_conduct/rule_3_3_candor_toward_the_tribunal/
[https://perma.cc/TH8W-V8FV]
58
S. DOC. NO. 116-12, at 161 (2020), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/
CDOC-116sdoc12/pdf/CDOC-116sdoc12-pt3.pdf [https://perma.cc/7R6Y-HSBR].
59
Michael Brice-Saddler, While bemoaning Mueller probe, Trump falsely says
the Constitution gives him ‘the right to do whatever I want’, THE WASHINGTON POST
(July 23, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/07/23/trump-falselytells-auditorium-full-teens-constitution-gives-him-right-do-whatever-i-want/
[https://perma.cc/VK42-QBVE].
60
S. DOC. NO. 116-12, at 161 (2020), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/
CDOC-116sdoc12/pdf/CDOC-116sdoc12-pt3.pdf [https://perma.cc/M7F6-D4N2].
55
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the misconduct set forth in the House’s two impeachment articles “would
permanently weaken the Presidency and forever alter the balance among
the branches of government in a manner that offends the constitutional
design established by the Framers.”61 That was a strong claim. The White
House lawyers were wishing for Trump as president to do exactly what
they argued Congress wished for itself—not to be subject to the
Constitution’s system of checks and balances. If impeachment was not
legitimate because it was “partisan,”62 and the President, according to his
lawyers, was not subject to civil or criminal accountability while he was
in office, then he was effectively above the law. There would be no bar to
him abusing his power by attempting to rig the presidential election.
To be sure, it made eminent sense for Trump’s lawyers to make
political appeals in a political proceeding, particularly since they had
enough votes in the Senate to preclude conviction. Yet, Trump’s lawyers
in the second trial claimed, with the Senate and nation listening, that “the
entire premise of [Trump’s] remarks [on January 6] was that the
democratic process would and should play out according to the letter of
the law.”63 This was pure fiction. Instead, according to Trump’s lawyers,
he was urging his Vice-President to reopen the certification of the election
and “send it back to the states,” even though Pence had no such power.64
Trump’s lawyers insisted that he had “encouraged those in attendance to
exercise their rights peacefully and patriotically.”65 Technically, this was
true. Trump uttered a sentence roughly along those lines, but his lawyers
neglected to mention that Trump’s statement contrasts with his using the
word “fight” twenty times. Michael Van der Veen declared that “at no
point was the president informed the vice president was in any danger,”66
but Senator Tommy Tuberville (R-AL), whom Trump urged to continue
to protest the election, told Trump that Vice-President Pence had to be

61

Id. at 145.
The fact that one political party’s members in Congress overwhelmingly
support a piece of legislation often has nothing to do with whether or not it is
constitutional. The same dynamic is true with impeachment.
63
Zack Beauchamp, The real reason Trump’s impeachment defense was so bad,
VOX (Feb. 12, 2021), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/22280400/trumpimpeachment-defense-bruce-castor-bad [https://perma.cc/GP3C-XKYB].
64
Aaron Glantz, Read Pence’s full letter saying he can’t claim ‘unilateral
authority’ to reject electoral votes, PBS (Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.pbs.org/
newshour/politics/read-pences-full-letter-saying-he-cant-claim-unilateral-authorityto-reject-electoral-votes [https://perma.cc/Y8NX-JX45].
65
Beauchamp, supra note 63.
66
Vanessa Romo, Republicans Seek Clarity On What Trump Knew About
Pence's Safety, NPR (Feb. 12, 2021), https://www.npr.org/sections/trumpimpeachment-trial-live-updates/2021/02/12/967517591/republicans-seek-clarity-onwhat-trump-knew-about-pences-safety [https://perma.cc/PZ5F-NZB7].
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taken out of the chamber for his safety.67 Trump’s lawyers blamed “the
Democrats” for not starting the trial before Trump’s term ended, but they
pointedly did not acknowledge the fact that Mitch McConnell, as Majority
Leader, refused to accept the articles until the day before Biden’s
inauguration. Van der Veen also told the Chamber that “[o]ne of the first
people arrested was a leader of antifa,” a claim decisively proven false.68
A third example of Trump’s lawyers likely violating federal laws
and/or ethical norms is their destruction of White House records that
federal law requires be preserved for the National Archives. During each
of the impeachment proceedings against Trump, there were rumors his
lawyers were destroying or withholding documents or records of his
possible misconduct. Such misbehavior has begun to come to light during
the January 6th Committee’s inquiries into Trump’s involvement in, and
knowledge of, the storming of the Capitol to prevent final congressional
certification of the 2020 presidential election. There is no question that
federal law requires preservation of official presidential records –
including visitor logs at the White House and records of phone calls to and
from the President – regardless of whether they reveal presidential
misconduct. Yet, it is fair to assume that Trump himself did not personally
destroy all possibly pertinent documents but had his lawyers do the dirty
work. Mr. Trump’s lawyers likely would defend any such destruction on
the basis of their broad constructions of the unitary theory of the
executive—that it is unconstitutional for Congress to compel or require
the president to take any actions with respect to the documents he
preserves, edits, or destroys. Yet, that defense is squarely at odds with
Supreme Court precedent to the contrary.69 Hence, the lawyers’
(presumed) misconduct violates clearly established law and thus also
violates ethical rules mandating that lawyers do not take any actions to
impede the administration of justice.70

67

Id.
Philip Bump, It didn’t take long for Trump’s attorneys to blame Jan. 6 on
antifa, THE WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 12, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/2021/02/12/didnt-take-long-trumps-attorneys-blame-jan-6-antifa
[https://perma.cc/MD7S-HM3F].
69
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
70
Besides Rule 3.3 requiring truthfulness and candor from attorneys, including
those working in the public sector, two other rules plainly bar any government
lawyers, including those who worked for Trump, from destroying evidence of criminal
or other misconduct. MODEL CODE OF PRO. RESP. r. 3.3 (Am. Bar Ass'n 1983). See
MODEL CODE OF PRO. RESP. r. 3.4 (Am. Bar Ass'n 1983) (requiring that legal counsel
refrain from obstructing lawful investigations, falsifying evidence, and knowingly
disobeying “the rules of a tribunal”); MODEL CODE OF PRO. RESP. r. 8.4 (Am. Bar
Ass'n 1983) (requiring lawyers to refrain from engaging in misconduct “prejudicial to
the administration of justice.”).
68
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Yet another response of administration lawyers to presidential
directives that they engage in illegal conduct is to resign in protest over or
publicly take issue with the president’s orders. In Watergate, this was
famously done when Attorney General Eliot Richardson and Deputy
Attorney General William Ruckelshaus resigned rather than comply with
the President’s order that they dismiss the Special Prosecutor investigating
the President’s misconduct.71 In contrast, Mr. Trump’s Attorney General,
William Barr, allowed the White House to announce his departure a week
ahead of time and made no public statement about his reasons for doing
so.72 Ethics complaints were subsequently filed against Barr before the
disciplinary board of the District of Columbia Bar, which dismissed the
complaints on the ground that it “did not intervene in matters that are
currently and publicly being discussed in the national political arena.”73
Other Trump administration officials chose not to resign. For
example, Chief White House Counsel Pat Cipollone, who led the
president’s defense in the first impeachment trial, did not resign. Rather
than pronouncing falsehoods and misrepresentations before the Senate in
the first trial, he and several Justice Department officials reportedly
threatened to resign during a White House meeting in which Mr. Trump
announced his plans to appoint loyalists in the Justice Department to
overturn the election results through voter fraud investigations. Trump
carried through with his plan, and Mr. Cipollone did not leave office until
after the inauguration of President Biden. While Mr. Cipollone might
privately claim that he remained to prevent presidential misconduct, his
failure to resign stands in marked contrast with the public testimony of
Nixon’s White House Counsel John Dean—who reported details of
Nixon’s misconduct while in office and resigned shortly thereafter.74
Later, he was disbarred in both Virginia and the District of Columbia for
his complicity in obstructing justice and sent to prison for several
71
Carroll Kilpatrick, Nixon Forces Firing of Cox; Richardson, Ruckelshaus
Quit, THE WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 21, 1973), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/national/longterm/watergate/articles/102173-2.htm
[https://perma.cc/5MSKQB2Z].
72
Allie Malloy, Devan Cole, Christina Carrega & Kevin Liptak, Attorney
General William Barr Resigns, CNN (Dec. 15, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/
2020/12/14/politics/william-barr-out-as-attorney-general/index.html
[https://perma.cc/2UVG-KDGP].
73
Jacqueline Thomsen, An Ethics Complaint Against Bill Barr Was Rejected,
and It Has Lawyers Worried, NAT’L L. J. (June 9, 2021), https://www.law.com/
nationallawjournal/2021/06/09/an-ethics-complaint-against-bill-barr-was-rejectedand-it-has-lawyers-worried/?slreturn=20220429115758
[https://perma.cc/7MS9MVMU].
74
Michael S. Rosenwald, John Dean is Trump’s latest target. Here’s how Dean
took
down
Nixon.,
THE WASHINGTON POST (June
10,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2019/06/10/john-dean-is-trumps-latesttarget-heres-how-he-took-down-nixon/ [https://perma.cc/B9UL-GLEQ].
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months.75 In contrast, Cipollone, after leaving the White House at the end
of Trump’s term, joined several other Trump White House lawyers in
opening the D.C. office of a prominent Los Angeles law firm.76
With William Barr gone, Trump elevated a mid-level Justice
Department official, Jeffrey Clark, to Acting Attorney General,77 and
accepted outside pro bono counsel from John Eastman, a well-known
conservative constitutional scholar, who joined Mr. Trump in rallying
supporters to storm the Capitol on January 6, 2021.78 Subsequently, Clark
has been facing complaints of unethical conduct before the disciplinary
board of the D.C. Bar.79 The Senate Judiciary Committee issued a report
critical of Clark’s brief tenure as Acting Attorney General,80 and the House
Committee investigating the January 6th attack on Congress has issued a
contempt charge against Clark for his failure to comply with a subpoena
ordering him to appear before the committee.81 Eastman, too, has faced
considerable backlash for his role in the January 6th insurrection—
including being forced to relinquish his position as a tenured law professor
at Chapman University, where he was once dean of the law school, fending
off document requests from the House Committee investigating the

75

John Dean Disbarred in District of Columbia, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 1974),
https://www.nytimes.com/1974/10/03/archives/john-dean-disbarred-in-district-ofcolumbia.html [https://perma.cc/6AE7-UC6B].
76
Peter Jeffrey, Trump Lawyer Cipollone to Open Washington Office for LA
Firm, BLOOMBERG LAW (Oct 7, 2021, 9:51 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/
business-and-practice/top-trump-lawyer-cipollone-to-open-washington-office-for-lafirm [https://perma.cc/2BCP-GJ29].
77
Amanda Carpenter, Who is Jeffrey Clark and Why Does He Matter?, THE
BULWARK (Dec. 7, 2021, 5:13 AM), https://www.thebulwark.com/who-is-jeffreyclark-and-why-does-he-matter/ [https://perma.cc/654C-KFQ5].
78
Michael S. Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, The Lawyer Behind the Memo on
How Trump Could Stay in Office, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/02/us/politics/john-eastman-trump-memo.html
[https://perma.cc/28U2-6KK9].
79
Lauren Stiller Rikleen, John T. Montgomery & James F. McHugh,
Disciplinary Complaints Await Former AAG Jeffrey Clark, BLOOMBERG LAW (Oct.
18, 2021, 3:01 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/legal-ethics/disciplinarycomplaints-await-former-aag-jeffrey-clark [https://perma.cc/FP2J-N7Q2]; See Katie
Benner, Ethics Board Moves to Penalize Jeffrey Clark, Who Aided Trump in Election
Plot, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/22/
us/politics/jeffrey-clark-dc-bar-justice.html [https://perma.cc/K3C8-3LK3].
80
Melissa Quinn, Senate report reveals new details about Trump's efforts to
push Justice Department to overturn election, CBS NEWS (Oct. 7, 2021 8:43 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-2020-election-justice-department-senatejudiciary-committee-report/ [https://perma.cc/BZ7K-VCVL].
81
Luke Broadwater, Possible Contempt Charge Hangs Over Trump Justice
Dept. Official, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/01/
us/politics/jeffrey-clark-contempt-congress.html [https://perma.cc/9LF4-VY8C].
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January 6th riots, and facing requests for his disbarment submitted to the
disciplinary board of the District of Columbia bar.82

V. REFORMING PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT
It is easy to poke holes in the federal impeachment process. Indeed,
a useful tactic among those defending presidents against the threat of
impeachment has been to create uncertainty and confusion over the law of
impeachment. If, for example, the House impeaches a president for
misconduct that is not codified as a felony in federal law, his defenders
might argue that only actual indictable felonies should count as
impeachable offenses, thus effectively narrowing the scope of possible
impeachable offenses a president might commit. If the president were
charged by the House with committing a federal crime, one defense might
be arguing that the House Managers have not shown how each element of
the crime has been committed. Additionally, the president’s lawyers could
argue that the crime alleged is not impeachable either because it does not
cause serious injury to the republic or was done in the president’s official
capacity. They might also argue that the procedures employed in the
House and/or Senate violate “due process of law,”83 which supposedly
might require additional safeguards such as cross-examination of hostile
witnesses (which may well have taken place), allowing the presence of the
targeted president and/or his counsel at every phase of the impeachment
proceedings, or sharing with the defense all evidence (and witnesses)
supporting the case for impeachment. Such defenses invite House
Managers to go into the weeds, or technicalities, of impeachment law at
the likely risk of losing public interest or confidence in the process.
The more difficult matters have to do with finding ways to fix the
process short of a constitutional amendment (which is practically
impossible). I examine several relatively modest reforms that can be done
with minimal modifications of the process. Their success primarily
depends on developing or fortifying the political will to ensure that the
process remains meaningful.
The first proposal is to follow several models of bipartisanship in
congressional inquiries. One such model is how the House Judiciary
Committee proceeded when investigating Nixon’s involvement in the
Watergate burglary. At that time, the House Judiciary Committee moved
slowly to build confidence in its consideration of Nixon’s possible
impeachment. Toward that end, the Committee staff was not technically
divided into a majority or minority but instead was tasked to operate
82
Paul Rosenzweig, Legal Ethics, Bar Discipline and John Eastman, LAWFARE
(Oct. 20, 2021 3:31 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/legal-ethics-bar-disciplineand-john-eastman [https://perma.cc/F4QX-449K].
83
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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jointly to the fullest extent possible. It ended up producing a widely
respected report on the background of the federal impeachment process.
That report is now considered the gold standard of historical work done on
the federal impeachment process and is an invaluable historiography.
A second model currently exists in the United States Senate,
particularly within the Intelligence Committee. The Senate Intelligence
Committee is designed to function in nonpartisan fashion. Although there
is a chair and deputy chair, the two generally issue joint statements, and
the eight members of the majority party and seven of the minority are also
encouraged by resolution and practice to speak with one voice.84 The
collaboration involved in Committee work gives both the Committee and
its work special stature in the Senate.
The successful model in national security could easily be adapted to
the impeachment context. If and when the Senate conducts investigations
that might implicate presidential misconduct, its leadership can choose to
assign the matter to a select committee modeled after the Senate’s own
Intelligence Committee. Given its organization, a select committee
investigating possible presidential misconduct differs dramatically from
the Senate Judiciary Committee, whose membership has long been split
down the middle ideologically and with little or no capacity for bipartisan
proceedings on politically sensitive matters—indeed matters involving the
protection of the nation’s security from presidential abuse.
It is not hard to imagine the impediments to reforms designed to
eliminate or reduce strident partisanship in impeachment proceedings.
Members of the House stubbornly refuse to do anything that could
advantage members of the opposing party. If, however, members were
tasked with developing a plan to take effect 10 years hence, they might be
forced to take the longer view—in which the institutional interests of the
House are taken seriously. These include doing work that withstands the
test of time, as did the work of the bipartisan House committee charged
with investigating Watergate. Further, future Houses and Senates could
follow other practices employed in Congress’s Watergate investigation,
including but not limited to: select committees, whose membership must
have equal numbers of members from each party; joint staffs; and even
joint schedules of the steps to be undertaken whenever a congressional
inquiry has revealed evidence of possible presidential misconduct that
warrants an impeachment inquiry.
A second proposal is for the House Judiciary Committee to use in its
impeachment inquiries prominent legal counsel that are approved by at
least two-thirds of the entire committee. Of course, a requirement of
84

See generally About the Committee: Overview of the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Responsibilities and Activities, U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/about [https://perma.cc/YS2WWYU7] (last visited May 28, 2022).
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unanimity can be easily scuttled by just one or two members who did not
wish to play nicely with the other side. To avoid that problem, a twothirds rule almost certainly will require some bipartisan support, which can
be used to appoint a lawyer of sufficiently great stature such that he or she
will be respected by members of both parties. This is no knock on any of
the lawyers who staffed the House impeachment proceedings against
Nixon, Clinton, and Trump; however, this proposal would allow the
Committee to avoid hyper-partisan debate that spreads misinformation
about the process or impedes an accurate understanding of it.
Watergate provides a good example of this approach: the Committee
Democrats and Republicans each hired prominent, widely respected
outside counsel to assist with the inquiry, John Doar for the majority and
Albert Jenner, Jr., for the minority.85 Doar was a Republican, who had
previously served as Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights in the
Department of Justice from 1960 to 1967.86 Jenner, a Democrat, had
previously served as an assistant counsel to the Warren Commission, chair
of the advisory committee developing the Federal Rules of Evidence, and
name partner of one of the country’s most prestigious law firms. Together,
Doar and Jenner ensured a high level of professionalism in the operations
of the Judiciary Committee.87 Without taking anything away from the
outside legal counsel employed by the majority in the first House
impeachment of Donald Trump, hiring outside counsel with no partisan
stake in the outcomes has the potential to lend credence to the
investigations of possible presidential misconduct.
A third reform is to hold the lawyers in the process to the highest
standards of professionalism. Lawyers who lie and spread falsehoods
violate basic rules of professional conduct, and lawyers who work in the
House or for any of the subjects of impeachment are no less obliged to
follow the rules of professional responsibility in their work. Thus, at the
very least, the Committee should adopt a referral mechanism enabling a
majority of its members to refer lawyers who have violated the rules of
professional responsibility to appropriate disciplinary authorities.
A fourth proposal is to consider limiting only certain portions of the
hearings for public viewing. Television seems to bring out the best – and
85

Stephen Bates, Road Map to Impeachment Proceedings? What Watergate Can
Teach Us About Unsealing the Mueller Report, LAWFARE (Apr. 3, 2019, 1:05 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/road-map-impeachment-proceedings-what-watergatecan-teach-us-about-unsealing-mueller-report [https://perma.cc/A2YW-XMDW].
86
A Champion of Civil Rights: John Doar Awarded the Medal of Freedom, THE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ARCHIVES (May 29, 2013),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/champion-civil-rights-john-doarawarded-medal-freedom/ [https://perma.cc/L33H-NUVG].
87
See The Impeachment Inquiry, in CQ ALMANAC 1974, available at
https://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/document.php?id=cqal74-1223105
[https://perma.cc/ARH5-3ENA].
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the worst – of members of Congress. Grandstanding or playing to
constituents does not edify anyone about the intricacies of the
impeachment process. Having some hearings held behind closed doors,
or at least not open to news coverage, could lower the temperature of the
proceedings. Just as the Supreme Court has been reluctant to allow media
coverage of oral arguments because of concerns that the justices or lawyers
will play to the crowds and grandstand, the House should be more reluctant
to allow coverage of every phase of the proceedings for public
consumption.
Fifth, the House and Senate leadership each should consider hiring
permanent staff for their respective impeachment inquiries. The people
hired as permanent staff would be chosen by House leadership, in
consultation with the House minority, but they would not depend on the
Committee’s composition to keep their jobs. Instead, they could be
appointed to ten-year terms during which they are assigned the
responsibilities of serving as staff in any impeachment inquiries,
regardless of which party controls the White House or the House of
Representatives.
Last, but far from least, three safeguards proved effective in curbing
Trump’s worst impulses and excesses in his final few months in office. To
some observers, each was a surprise, though each was instrumental in
protecting the integrity of the 2020 presidential election and the rule of
law.
First, state and federal judges rejected largely dubious claims made
by lawyers trying to overturn the “rigged presidential election” in sixtyone out of the sixty-two cases filed,88 with Trump’s one victory not making
a difference to the final tally in the outcome of Pennsylvania’s popular
vote in the 2020 presidential election.
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William Cummings, Joey Garrison & Jim Sergent, By the Numbers: President
Trump’s Failed Efforts to Overturn the Election, USA TODAY (Jan. 6, 2021),
https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/politics/elections/2021/01/06/trumpsfailed-efforts-overturn-election-numbers/4130307001/
[https://perma.cc/KH2YWY75]; A Brookings Institution Report suggests that the data is slightly more
complicated in that “Trump’s election litigation efforts failed decisively, even though
more judges than is generally assumed found his lawyers’ arguments
persuasive.” Russell Wheeler, Trump’s judicial campaign to upend the 2020 election:
A failure, but not a wipe-out, BROOKINGS (Nov. 30, 2021),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2021/11/30/trumps-judicial-campaign-toupend-the-2020-election-a-failure-but-not-a-wipe-out/
[https://perma.cc/9W97UB9X]; Wheeler notes that there were 13 cases filed in federal court, all the outcomes
of which were not in Trump’s favor and in which every Trump appointee voted against
Trump. Id. The state court litigation, which occurred in seven battleground states
Trump lost, went almost entirely against Trump, with one state court judge ruling in
his favor in an inconsequential case but “Thirty-five percent of decisions by
Republican-affiliated state court judges were for Trump.” Id.
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The second safeguard checking Trump’s efforts to overturn the
election was federalism, a notion usually championed by Republican
presidents and judges and justices appointed by Republican presidents.
Starting on the day of the presidential election through early January 2021,
many lawyers and state officials were tasked with protecting the integrity
of the electoral process in their respective jurisdictions. Perhaps the most
notable were Republican officials in the two hotly contested states of
Arizona and Georgia. In Arizona, Republican state officials not only
certified the outcome in Biden’s favor but also issued a ninety-three-page
report that found efforts within the State to overturn the outcome were
based almost entirely on misleading or false claims.89
In Georgia, both the Republican Governor and Republican Secretary
of State steadfastly stood by the integrity of the outcome of the presidential
election there and resisted Trump’s personal pleas for them to overturn the
election result.90 The Republican Secretary of State went further to record
a long phone conversation in which Trump repeatedly asked his office “to
find 11,780 votes, which is one more than we have” and thus declare him
the winner of Georgia’s popular vote and electors.91 The Republican
Secretary of State and his counsel resisted and certified Biden’s win in
Georgia. Trump is now under criminal investigation for possible voter
fraud in Georgia based on the taped recording of his conversation with
Georgia officials.92
Finally, it appears that at least sixteen people have been disciplined
for breaching the rules of professional responsibility in the jurisdictions in
which they have been licensed to practice law. Perhaps the two most
notable of these attorneys are Rudy Giuliani, who has had his bar license
suspended in both New York93 and the District of Columbia for false
See Michael Wines, Arizona Vote Review Is ‘Political Theater’ and ‘Sham,’
G.O.P. Leaders Say, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/
05/17/us/arizona-audit-trump.html [https://perma.cc/Q7VQ-ZGDR].
90
Felicia Sonmez, Georgia leaders rebuff Trump’s call for special session to
overturn election results, THE WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 6, 2020, 10:45 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/brian-kemp-trump-election-results/
2020/12/06/4c5db908-37d4-11eb-9276-ae0ca72729be_story.html
[https://perma.cc/5VQ6-KKXK].
91
Michael D. Shear & Stephanie Saul, Trump, in Taped Call, Pressured Georgia
Official to ‘Find’ Votes to Overturn Election, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/03/us/politics/trump-raffensperger-callgeorgia.html [https://perma.cc/5XQ6-4T48].
92
Kevin Johnson & Bart Jansen, Georgia prosecutor seeks grand jury to
investigate possible Trump 'criminal disruptions' on 2020 election, USA TODAY (Jan.
20, 2022, 1:17 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2022/01/20/georgiafulton-county-prosecutor-grand-jury-investigate-donald-trump/6594162001/
[https://perma.cc/MLF4-UM2J].
93
See Nicole Hong, William K. Rashbaum & Ben Protess, Court Suspends
Giuliani’s Law License, Citing Trump Election Lies, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2021),
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statements and lies made in court filings and public appearances regarding
the 2020 presidential election and other matters,94 and Sidney Powell, who
has been fined heavily for her misrepresentations in court and is facing
disbarment.95 Moreover, the 65 Project has been formed to identify all the
lawyers who broke ethical rules in challenging the results of the 2020
presidential election.96 Its work will undoubtedly make it harder for the
lawyers involved to evade their professional obligations.
Presumably, high-ranking executive branch officials, such as cabinet
secretaries and the Attorneys General, have little or no fear that they will
ever be sanctioned or disciplined for deviating from the rules of
professional responsibility. True, Nixon’s Attorney General John Mitchell
was disbarred in New York after he was convicted and sentenced to prison
for perjury and obstruction of justice.97 Yet, in the absence of such
convictions, it is far from clear or certain that Attorney Generals or other
federal prosecutors will face disciplinary proceedings for ever doing the
president’s bidding. Given that most disciplinary proceedings are held
behind closed doors, we do not yet know, and may never know for sure,
how the complaints against other Justice Department or Trump lawyers
went nowhere.
Regrettably, there is little, if any, evidence indicating that the Rules
of Professional Responsibility, federal laws, ethical norms, and traditions
constrained White House counsel and other lawyers within the
administration from facilitating Trump’s impeachable (and unlawful)
misbehavior. Shortly after Watergate, law schools started requiring law
students to take a course in legal ethics.98 The idea was to increase
lawyers’ awareness of the ethical rules governing their profession, but it is
unclear to what extent such courses have reduced or diminished unethical
lawyering. Nor would it seem that additional or different rules of
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/24/nyregion/giuliani-law-license-suspendedtrump.html [https://perma.cc/46AF-V46K].
94
Christina Wilkie & Dan Mangan, Rudy Giuliani’s DC law license is
suspended, CNBC (July 7, 2021, 6:24 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/07/07/rudygiulianis-dc-law-license-is-suspended-.html [https://perma.cc/R8FP-QZ53].
95
Erik Larson, Sidney Powell Sanctioned by Judge Over False Election Claims,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 25, 2021, 5:35 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2021-08-25/powell-gop-election-fraud-lawyers-sanctioned-by-michiganjudge [https://perma.cc/N4Q9-DRAJ].
96
THE 65 PROJECT, https://the65project.com/ [https://perma.cc/ZW68-ZEMW]
(last visited May 28, 2022).
97
Morris Kaplan, Mitchell Disbarred As Lawyer in State, N.Y. TIMES (July 4,
1975), https://www.nytimes.com/1975/07/04/archives/mitchell-disbarred-as-lawyerin-state-mitchell-is-disbarred-in.html [https://perma.cc/8XDQ-7Z5D].
98
See Mark Hansen, 1965-1974: Watergate and the rise of legal ethics, ABA
JOURNAL (Jan. 1, 2015, 5:10 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/
1965_1974_watergate_and_the_rise_of_legal_ethics
[https://perma.cc/EDR3C9G2].
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professional responsibility would be any more effective at curbing
lawyers’ misconduct on behalf of powerful figures such as the president
of the United States.
If the House January 6th Committee becomes aware of lawyers’
participation in the facilitation of illegal misconduct, their misconduct
should be made public and their names forwarded to appropriate
jurisdictions for discipline and possible disbarment. Even if there were
lawyers who opposed illegal activity within the administration, they failed
(as far as we now know) to report the misconduct of other lawyers to
appropriate authorities and, as a result, violated Rule 8.3 of the Rules of
Professional Conduct.99
Lawyers, as a profession, are duty-bound to be truthful and candid,
especially in legal proceedings. They thus had crucial roles in not
becoming complicit with or facilitating untruths, falsehoods, and
misleading characterizations of the law and facts. One has to ignore reality
to suggest, as Mr. Trump and others have done, that there was no physical
attack on Congress on January 6, 2021, but instead “tourists” visiting the
Capitol,100 or Trump voters merely engaging in “legitimate political
discussion” regarding the 2020 presidential election at the Capitol. Any
such characterizations are contradicted by a remarkable array of real,
credible evidence to the contrary, including but not limited to the media’s
video tapes, eyewitness testimony, security cameras within the Capitol,
and the guilty pleas of more than 200 people who stormed the Capitol on
January 6, 2021. Indeed, the Republican leader in the Senate, Mitch
McConnell (R-KY), declared, “We saw it happen. It was a violent
insurrection for the purpose of trying to prevent the peaceful transfer of
power after a legitimately certified election, from one administration to the
next. That’s what it was.”101

VI. CONCLUSION: WHERE TO FROM HERE?
We have hardly seen the last of impeachment. This is not because
members of Congress have developed a taste for the process (no one
involved has ever said afterwards they relished the experience) or that it
has become a partisan weapon each side may use for its own inappropriate
purposes. It is because it has had more impact than its critics acknowledge.
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.3 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2020).
See Bess Levin, Republican Lawhttpmakers Claim January 6 Rioters Were
Just Friendly Guys and Gals Taking a Tourist Trip through the Capitol, VANITY FAIR
(May 12, 2021), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2021/05/capitol-attack-touristvisit [https://perma.cc/HZ7E-EHFA].
101
Jonathan Weisman & Annie Karni, McConnell Denounces R.N.C. Censure
of Jan. 6 Panel Members, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/
02/08/us/politics/republicans-censure-mcconnell.html
[https://perma.cc/K689GL45].
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In the rarified world of presidents, legacies matter. In Trump’s case, his
legacy will likely not be what he wants, for it will be a legacy in which his
two impeachments and fallout from post-presidential investigations in
Congress and by prosecutors will be front and center.
Once we move beyond Trump and the presidency, there is much work
to be done in Congress and in the bar to protect against any future
presidents’ manifesting greater disdain for the rule of law than even Trump
did. In Congress, reforming the federal impeachment process itself is long
overdue. We need only to look to the past for guidance. For example, the
special committees assembled in the Senate and the House Judiciary
Committees – each of which spent nearly two years investigating the
possible origins of the Watergate break-in and considering possible
impeachment charges against Richard Nixon – remain a model for how
such inquiries should be done. In the House, there was a bipartisan staff,
which wrote the definitive report on the history of the federal impeachment
process; and the cooperation of Democratic and Republican senators in
uncovering the misconduct of the president ensured that their inquiries
stand the test of time.
Perhaps the most important option for leaders and lawyers is to make
clear to everyone what higher power(s) they serve, especially when the
Congress and nation face possible constitutional crises. Is it their party
and their own political ambitions, or is it the institution to which they have
been elected, the clients they represent, and the Constitution and rule of
law? It should be incumbent for every official to make crystal clear the
principles, not the party, that they serve. The deep polarization of the
American people, leading to deep polarization in Congress, makes such
reforms unlikely, unless or until voters from both parties agree on the
importance of having representatives and senators who are able not to see
each other as enemies of the republic but instead as partners, who are
genuinely committed to working together for the common good of the
United States.
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